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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

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A History of the

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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A History of the Central Intelligence Bulletin

by




Office of Current Intelligence



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A History of the Central Intelligence Bulletin

I. Introduction

The purpose of the Central (originally Current) Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) from its inception in 1951 has been simple and straightforward--to inform the President of the United States and high-level U.S. Government policy-makers each day of the most noteworthy intelligence and to provide an evaluation of it. The CIB's success lies in the fact that in over 5,000 issues in 16 years, in an increasingly competent manner, it has presented this intelligence in a manner found useful by many officials. The CIB's major problem has been to ensure that it commands the attention of all those to whom it is addressed.

Since the time of President Truman, the producers of the Bulletin have had to accept the fact that the process of "informing the President" does not necessarily involve his own reading of the publication. Nonetheless, the chief policy advisers on the White House staff in the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson have

read it, and they have briefed the President selectively on its contents. Since 1961, the President personally has read the President's Daily Brief, which is based on the Bulletin. Apart from the Daily Brief, the Bulletin has come closer to the summit than any other current intelligence publication, and its circulation among influential policy-makers has been wider than that of the Daily Brief. Since 1958, the Bulletin has been the only national-level daily publication whose contents have been coordinated with, and approved by, the State and Defense Departments and CIA.

II. Origin of the Current Intelligence Bulletin

"After all, what one wants to know is not what people did, but why they did it--or rather, why they thought they did it."

--R. L. Stevenson

The Central Intelligence Bulletin is the lineal descendant of the first production requested by the President from the Central Intelligence Agency. On 22 January 1946, President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), to be headed by a Director of Central Intelligence. Within a few days he asked the CIG to furnish him with a selected summary of all important items of intelligence coming to Washington. 1/ Thus was born the Daily Summary, which was produced for five years until 28 February 1951, when it was replaced by the Current Intelligence Bulletin.

The transition from the Daily Summary to the Bulletin was not a quick and easy one, however. It came out of the reorganization of the Agency undertaken by Lt. General Walter Bedell Smith and William H. Jackson, who became respectively Director (DCI) and Deputy Director (DDCI) of Central Intelligence

early in October 1950. In the process of this reorganization, the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) was created. Some knowledge of this reorganization is necessary to appreciate the nature of the Bulletin.

There are many facts about the background and emergence of OCI that can be documented, but there is also much that must be deduced, especially concerning the intentions of Messrs. Smith and Jackson. Their views were heavily influenced by the considerable dissatisfaction within the intelligence community, including CIA, over the organization, procedures, and products of the Agency in the two years (1947-49) following its establishment. One of the chief complaints was that CIA was going beyond its intended boundaries.

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3 (NSCID-3) of 13 January 1948 defined current intelligence as "that spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation." It went on to say

that "The CIA and the several agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements or external responsibilities." Nonetheless, the State Department held that CIA was encroaching on its territory by engaging in political (and sociological) reporting. Indeed, this had been the immediate reaction of Secretary of State Byrnes to the first issue of the Daily Summary. 2/

Among the investigations of CIA, the most important was conducted by a committee headed by Allen Dulles and including Matthias Correa and William H. Jackson. In July 1949, this committee made sweeping recommendations concerning CIA's internal and external affairs. Regarding intelligence production, the committee's report, known as the Dulles Report, took the position that CIA should engage only in making coordinated estimates, in producing reports needed by the Agency itself, and in carrying on research requested by the community as a "matter of common concern." CIA should abandon any work that was "superfluous or competitive with the proper

activities of departmental intelligence." The report recommended that the current intelligence publications be discontinued. It made no mention of the reporting of hostilities indications.

The National Security Council adopted the Dulles Report's recommendations, and in effect told CIA to put them into practice. Still, nothing was done for over a year. Jackson, however, made his acceptance of the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence contingent on General Smith's acceptance of the report. Soon after he took office, as Director of Central Intelligence, Smith told the National Security Council that he would implement the report (with an exception regarding the Clandestine Services). Smith and Jackson were eager "to withdraw CIA from any debatable types of functions and programs, especially in certain fields of intelligence research and production." 3/ It is ironic that, starting with a bias against current intelligence, the new Agency heads came around in a matter of weeks to setting up an office specifically to produce it. As one writer commented a few years later, "It is quite evident that this development had not been foreseen." 4/

More than one consideration impelled Smith and Jackson toward the decisions that were ultimately taken, but one of the most important was the existence of the Daily Summary and the fact that the White House still wanted it. The difficulty was that the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), which had produced the Summary, had been dissolved. The Director's recourse was to give responsibility for the daily to the new Office of National Estimates (ONE). It is not clear whether Smith intended this to be a permanent assignment. Nonetheless, shortly after its establishment on 13 November 1950, ONE began to form a daily production staff under R. Jack Smith, who had been responsible for the daily in ORE, and was publishing before the end of the month.

Unrelated at this time to the Daily Summary were the Agency's activities in the field of communications intelligence (Comint). In the ORE era, the policy-making body in the Comint field was the Advisory Council, while ORE's General Division, headed by [redacted]

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25X1A [redacted] exploited Comint for finished intelligence production.

Since July 1950, General Division, at the President's request, had produced a weekly Situation Summary

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utilizing Comint and focused on military threats to the United States. On 1 December 1950, General Smith converted the Advisory Council into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under [redacted] By 13 December it seemed fairly clear that General Division and its hostilities indications function would be brought into OSS. 5/ Thus OSS would provide the Director with intelligence derived from Comint and furnish him any indications of hostile action.

The OSS leadership almost immediately perceived that it could not satisfactorily discharge its indications function cut off from the non-Comint base that General Division had enjoyed as a part of ORE. As Kingman Douglass wrote in December 1951, "it was agreed by all concerned that under existing handicaps in the field of Comint, Comint alone provided an inadequate base for quick and effective briefing of the Director and, through him, the President and the National Security Council." 6/ But to exploit all sources of information a much larger staff was required than the 40 or so contemplated for OSS. Fortunately, there was a pool of around 150 intelligence analysts in the now-defunct regional divisions

of ORE. On 21 December, Jackson apparently approved their transfer to OSS to assist the functions of that office. 7/

During the balance of the month, in which the organization of the enlarged office was mainly accomplished, at least on paper, the concept of its function was almost imperceptibly changing from that of supplying chiefly indications intelligence to that of producing current intelligence in general. In the discussions of the planning officials, there was now talk of current intelligence of a broad regional and functional character and of "spot information and intelligence to guide immediate operation and policy determinations." 8/

By the turn of the year, Jackson had decided that the Daily Summary should be transferred from ONE to OSS, a decision aided by the fact that the Assistant Director for National Estimates, William Langer, was anxious to free his office of this task. The Daily Summary had been criticized by the Dulles Committee for reporting almost exclusively from State Department sources. Placing the Summary in OSS would make it possible to produce an all-source publication.

On 4 January 1951 Lyman Kirkpatrick, executive assistant to the DCI, told W. Park Armstrong, head of the State Department's intelligence branch, of "Mr. Jackson's intentions with regard to developing a strong Daily Intelligence Summary for the President in place of the existing Daily Summary, which is judged to be inadequate. Mr. Kirkpatrick explained the present plan for developing OSS and the inclusion in that area of a current intelligence staff." 9/

Armstrong endorsed the plan, but saw hazards in any attempt to summarize operations, policy, or policy developments. He recognized, however, that such material might occasionally have to be used to make a report understandable. He stressed that any sensitive State Department telegrams used by CIA should be seen by a very limited number of people.

It was to be nearly two months before the new office took over the President's daily, the intervening time being required to get on an operating basis and to acquire some experience in producing the kind of items desired for the new publication.

In a meeting on 11 January of top officials, among them Jackson and Kingman Douglass (who had become Assistant Director for Special Services on

4 January), it was decided that the name OSS should be changed to OCI--the Office of Current Intelligence--to evidence the fact that CIA had set up a special office in that field. 10/

This change did not mean, however, that OCI was authorized to plunge headlong into all kinds of current intelligence activity and publications, as had ORE. Except perhaps on the hostilities indications side, OCI was expected to deal with world events less profoundly, less voluminously, and with more intellectual modesty than ORE had. For one thing, General Smith wrote Secretary of State Acheson on 1 February 1951 that he was taking CIA out of intelligence research in the political, sociological, and cultural fields 11/, and Jackson wrote similarly to Park Armstrong. 12/

There was also the necessity for OCI to avoid encroaching on ONE's sphere. The boundary between current and estimative intelligence had been a troublesome subject in the high-level planning talks of December 1950. Langer felt that ONE's jurisdiction did not begin with estimating future developments, but with estimating or evaluating the current situation,

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leaving OCI in the business only of supplying "the facts." But [redacted] Deputy Assistant Director of OSS, insisted to Kirkpatrick that the functions of OSS went "beyond library facilities" and into interpretations and appreciations. 13/ With no dissent from Kirkpatrick, OCI went into operation on this basis.

The new element that OCI brought to intelligence production was the all-source concept. Never before had an office in the U.S. Government been organized to produce intelligence on the basis of the full range of extant information, Comint and collateral, classified and public.

The all-source approach was particularly valuable for reporting hostilities indications, a function unusually prominent around the time of OCI's birth. The Korean War was only about six months old, the intelligence community had been surprised by the entrance of the Chinese Communists, watch committees had sprung up, and there was fear that the Korean War might be the prelude to aggressive Soviet moves elsewhere in the world, including Europe. Undoubtedly, the first task of a current

intelligence office was to put itself in the best position to give as much warning as possible of threats to U.S. security.

For these reasons, the specialists who had been brought into OSS from the regional divisions of ORE on 21 December 1950 were considered by OCI's leaders to have as their main task the support of the Indications Branch which had come from General Division. They were in fact called the Support Branch for the first six months of OCI's existence. This relationship also showed in the fact that the editorial staff for the office as a whole was a part of the Indications Branch for the same six months.

By mid-January 1951, the Director of Central Intelligence had given OCI two principal production assignments--to report on hostilities indications and to produce a daily intelligence report. It may seem curious that only one of these assignments is mentioned in the first official statement of the Mission and Functions of the Assistant Director, Office of Current Intelligence (AD/OCI). Issued X1 as CIA Regulation [] on 19 January 1951, this statement charged the Assistant Director of OCI

"with producing an evaluated Daily Summary of current intelligence and with providing special intelligence services of an all-source character."

On production, the specification of functions went no further than to say that the Daily Summary was to be based on "all sources" and to include "evaluated CIA comment." Probably the reason that the Daily Summary was the only product mentioned was the expectation that it would carry reports of the most important indications of Soviet hostile intentions.

Even though not all transfers of personnel from ORE had been completed, the new current intelligence office (formally still OSS until 15 January 1951) went into operation on 4 January. On that day a memorandum

25X1A from [redacted] Chief of the Support Branch in

25X1A [redacted] Current Intelligence Division, announced the first of the new publications of the future OCI and gave directions for its production, which was to commence the next day. The publication was called the Daily Summary of Significant Traffic and was to contain "highly selected items of intelligence" in several categories. The categories

were identified as Soviet/Communist intentions or capabilities, important developments within a region, and other information reflecting trends, indications, or developments. Following a paraphrase of the field report, each item was to carry an analyst's comment on its significance.

The first issue of the new Daily Summary contained 36 items.

Getting into production on the Summary gave OCI's analysts a chance to warm up for the major production--the presidential daily. It was anticipated that the Summary, which was written in the morning, would be a direct step in the production of the presidential daily, which would draw on the most important Summary items. Things never worked out that way, however. From the beginning, the presidential daily was written without direct reference to the Summary.

Throughout February 1951, OCI engaged in producing dry runs of the presidential publication. The format was unaltered throughout this period and carried over into the official publication. Items were prepared in gist and comment style (as in the Summary) and were grouped under descriptive geographic

headings, such as "Far East," "Korea," or "Western Europe." These headings were not standardized, but were adapted to the material presented. Sources were cited in a general way without the use of document numbers. A summary page preceded the individual items, which numbered from four to nine. While there was obviously a strong effort to use Comint to the fullest possible extent, the all-source concept was reflected in the considerable use of State and CIA cables, and even some use of the press. When the "dry run" began, the publication was called the CIA Daily, but on 15 February 1951 its name was changed to the Current Intelligence Bulletin.

The Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) made its first official appearance on 28 February 1951, when the Daily Summary came to an end. The inaugural issue of the CIB contained six items, four of them based on Comint, one on a State cable, and one [redacted]

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25X1A [redacted] Foreign Broadcast Information

Service (FBIS) report. The items informed U.S. policy-makers that [redacted]

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25X1D [redacted] many of General MacArthur's ideas on the Far East were being adopted;

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25X6 [redacted]

25X6 [redacted] was trying to re-

plenish domestic lead stocks by purchases from the United States; that the North Koreans had completed mine-laying operations in Wonsan Bay; that Philippine Foreign Secretary Romulo favored a broad and firm Pacific defense pact; that [redacted]

25X6

25X6 [redacted]

would oppose the Schuman Plan; and that a Titóist movement had been uncovered in the Czech Communist Party.

The new daily was an immediate success. A copy was flown to President Truman (then in Florida), who wrote to General Smith, "You have hit the jackpot with this, Bedell!" 14/

III. The Bulletin Under Way

Early Operations

In the beginning, guidance on the selection of material for the Bulletin was not set down on paper. Work proceeded on the general understanding that what was wanted was the cream of information of interest to the U.S. Government. Matters bearing on U.S. security were of course the most important, but it was recognized that many other developments were part of the necessary informational stock of policymakers. In general, the Bulletin was what its name suggested--a succinct report and comment on a variety of important new developments.

Originally, the Bulletin was given a very limited dissemination outside the Agency. The inside cover of the first issue listed the addressees as the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three service chiefs. Further dissemination as it may have existed then is not known, but in January 1952 additional copies were being sent to General Eisenhower (then SACEUR), the National Security Council, Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence,

State's Comint office, and the Armed Forces Security Agency (two copies). Altogether, total outside dissemination at this time was to 13 addressees.15/

When the Bulletin was two months old, General Smith told Kingman Douglass that it seemed to be "exactly what was required." 16/ A favorable verdict was also rendered on 8 June 1951 by the Advisor for

25X1A Management, [redacted] "Within the past three months, the Office of Current Intelligence has achieved remarkable results. It has maintained a continuity in current intelligence reporting throughout the re-organization and has produced an 'all-source' product which has received favorable comment from the President and other governmental policy-makers." 17/

In a report for the Director on 11 July 1951, Douglass commented that "The time during which OCI has been operating is scarcely long enough to enable us to make a definitive judgment upon its detailed operations. The time has been sufficient, however, I believe, for me to be able to say that the concept on which it is based is sound." Recalling again the uncertainty which the U.S. Government felt about the outlook for peace and the consequent stress on timely warning of trouble, Douglass explained OCI's concept in these terms: "...in order to avoid another

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Pearl Harbor, we should see to it that the men who make the final decisions have all the information that your Government is able to supply them--and that without delay." 18/

On 24 July 1951, a new Table of Organization and new Mission Statements were approved for OCI. In contrast to the Mission Statement of 19 January 1951, the Comint responsibilities of the Assistant Director, Current Intelligence (AD/CI) were emphasized and his mission was broadened and generalized to include the production and dissemination of all-source current intelligence. A detailed passage under Functions called upon the AD/OCI to "produce current intelligence based upon facts and indications marshalled from all sources and disseminate the same by means of a daily bulletin and such other publications, graphic presentations, and briefings as may be necessary or desirable for its most efficient utilization." 19/

In its first year of publication under the new rules, the Bulletin ran into the kind of dispute with ONE that was foreshadowed by the position taken by Langer in the planning talks in December 1950.

ONE for a time had a representative on OCI's Publications Board, and he took careful note of what he regarded as OCI's invasions of estimative territory. This activity resulted in a long memorandum from Langer to Douglass, detailing OCI's sins.

Douglass made a very brief response, to the effect that ONE personnel should have better things to do than keeping such tabulations. 20/ Eventually this antagonism died down, as both offices got more into the substance of their basically distinct work, and OCI learned to avoid the use of the word "estimate."

The reorganization of OCI in July 1951 did, however, bring about the adoption of a new system of CIB publication review. In place of substantive review and editing by one member of the Editorial Staff, the "community review" plan was instituted.

A Publications Board was created, consisting of

25X1A [redacted] Chairman, and the three regional division chiefs (though branch chiefs sometimes sat in their place). The Board met each afternoon to consider submissions for the next day's issue. 21/ Although all Board members participated in the discussion of each proposed item, the final determination

to publish or not was made by the Chairman. On rare occasions, the decision was referred to [redacted]

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25X1A [redacted] (then Chief of the Intelligence Staff) or to the Assistant Director.

25X1A [redacted] Editorial Staff, which had been part of the Indications Branch, was put under the Publications Board, and one editor was assigned to work closely with each of the regional divisions. This scheme foreshadowed the Production Assistant plan instituted in 1962. Bulletin submissions were normally initiated in the branches and were reviewed by branch and division chiefs. The assigned editor, however, was responsible for seeing that the items were clear and in the preferred style when they went to the Publications Board. During the night, the watch officers and the intelligence duty officer kept a close eye on all incoming material bearing on the Bulletin items. Normally, upon the receipt of important new information, these officers did not themselves alter items or write new ones. Instead, they called in the originating analysts to do the work. This general system of Bulletin production continued

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from 1951 until the CIB was made an inter-agency coordinated publication at the beginning of 1958.

Creation of the Publications Board reduced the possibility of the mistakes which had occasionally marred the first weeks of the Bulletin's production. In March 1951, a [redacted] submission had translated the term "radio rockets" as indicating that the North Koreans had missiles. A few days later a separate item had to be run admitting on retranslation that radar, not missiles, was meant. In May, a CIB issue had not even been disseminated before it had to be corrected, but mechanical problems prevented total elimination of the mistake.

The first item in the body of the CIB said the Soviets had proposed a Big Five meeting to prepare a Japanese peace treaty. It was topped, however, by a correction sheet to the effect that the Soviets had really proposed a Big Four meeting. In addition, the Publications Board probably would not have passed an item published in May which was exclusively an account of the State Department's policy and possible moves in the case of William

Oatis, a U.S. newspaperman imprisoned by the Czechs.

This item was exactly what Park Armstrong had warned against in January 1951.

The installation of General Eisenhower in the Presidency in January 1953 led to the introduction of temporary new review procedures in regard to the Bulletin. President Truman had been a faithful reader of the CIB; President Eisenhower preferred to be briefed by members of his staff. Accordingly, it was arranged that each day the Publications Board would check the items it thought Col. Carroll (later General Goodpaster) in the White House should bring to the attention of the President. Col. Carroll ordinarily briefed the President twice a week, on Wednesdays and Fridays, and this system prevailed throughout the eight years of President Eisenhower's administration. 22/ In 1961, however, the practice of marking special items was abandoned.

Coverage

The subject matter of interest to Bulletin readers was soon established and has not markedly changed in 15 years, as may be seen from these examples published in 1951 under the leadership of Kingman Douglass:

Possible military coup in Greece
Speed-up in Sovietization of Poland
Size of Communist strength in Austrian police
New air equipment arriving in Korea
Yugoslav will to resist Soviet attack low
Dutch consider Soviet attack in Balkans
this year unlikely
Increased Soviet interest in Latin America
Threatened split in Western position on Germany
French to aid India in atomic pile construction
Fighting between Israeli and Syrian troops
Junta ousts Bolivian President
Europeans increasingly concerned over defense
burden.

The same subjects continued to be of interest when Huntington D. Sheldon succeeded Kingman Douglass as Assistant Director in July 1952. Consequently, in the following six years, the CIB, issued Monday through Saturday, went about its task of reporting on similar developments and situations everywhere in the world. Over a period of a year, nearly every country or region was dealt with at some time. To begin with, any major foreign development known

to the general public was usually treated from some angle in the CIB, which has often been called a "classified newspaper." Sometimes there was classified information to supplement or correct the public media. On other occasions, a situation called for interpretation by OCI's area experts. The Bulletin's forte, however, has always been the publication of classified information completely unknown to the public. Prominent in this category have been facts pertaining to the military capabilities and intentions of the Communist states.

Broadly, subject coverage in the Bulletin in its earliest years as compared with the mid-1960s was much heavier on Eastern and Western Europe, lighter on Latin America, very much lighter on Africa, and about the same on the Soviet Union, Communist China, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The number of items in each issue also was higher, often running to 11 or 13.

The Cold War and the Communist threat have always been the major preoccupations of the Bulletin, as they have of U.S. foreign and security policy-makers.

The strengths, weaknesses, and political orientation of important non-Communist countries, both neutral and pro-West, have also generally been of interest, although considerably more space was allotted to reporting on them in the 1950s than in the 1960s. Weaknesses and signs of deterioration have received much more persistent coverage than strengths and improvements. One reason is that OCI has consciously regarded itself as a fire alarm, having Pearl Harbor in mind and the indications function in its makeup. Also, subconsciously at work has been the journalistic tendency which equates news with disasters.

In the mid-1950s the policy was adopted of using the Bulletin to record the major conclusions of task forces that were set up to deal with dangerous situations. This policy is still in force. Task forces have sometimes been entirely staffed with OCI personnel; sometimes they have been joint OCI-ONE operations, and sometimes they have been put on an inter-agency basis. The Taiwan Strait situation in 1955 brought about the first example of this last practice. A Current Intelligence Group

was set up under the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC--the predecessor of USIB), and an abbreviated version of its daily report was run as the last item in the CIB for some time. This later became a weekly report and was then discontinued until the Strait situation heated up again in 1957. Similar use has been made of the work of the task forces on the Arab-Israeli situation (1956), Berlin (1958-61), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the Dominican Republic crisis and the Indo-Pakistani War (1965), and Vietnam (1965 to the present).

Reproduction

The all-source nature of the Bulletin required that it be reproduced "behind the barrier," i.e., in OCI's restricted Comint area (in Q Bldg. until the move to Langley in 1961). In the first year, the production job was carried out by two men, one of them OCI's security officer. In 1952, reproduction was taken over by Printing Services Division, although priority and quality control remained with OCI and was exercised by [redacted]

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25X1A [redacted] The Bulletin has always been produced by the

offset process, the best adapted to rapid reproduction of typewritten material. In 1951 and for some years thereafter two Addressograph-Multigraph machines were used. Eventually more machines were added, and by 1961 conversion had been made to the A.B. Dick Offset Duplicator. In 1968 there were nine of these, used not only for the Bulletin but for all of OCI's productions.

In 1954 the acquisition of a Robertson studio camera made possible a photo-offset capability and the introduction of maps and illustrations into the Bulletin. The desire to tell as graphic a story of the Indochina conflict as possible resulted in the technical success of registering several colors accurately on maps, something the equipment was not originally designed to do. This was first accomplished in the CIB for 22 February 1954. Early in 1961, the old Robertson camera was replaced by a 18x22-inch Monotype, which has a larger range of magnification and reduction. 23/

Dissemination

By mid-1954, 33 copies of the CIB were going outside the Agency as compared to the 14 in January 1952.

The Defense Department was taking a dozen more, the State Department two more, the National Security Agency (NSA) five more, and the newly-created National Indications Center was put on the list for one copy. 24/

A further growth of readership occurred over the next three years, i.e., during the remainder of the period before the interagency-coordinated daily was established. In July 1957 a copy was going to the Vice President's Aide, and new subscribers (as compared with 1954) were the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), USCIB, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), and the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). Defense, State, and NSA had asked for a few more copies, and one was addressed to the Staff Director of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, Brig. General John F. Cassidy. Outside dissemination had now reached 48. 25/

In 1957-58 OCI began cabling the CIB overseas. For some time before that, the Air Force had been cabling the Bulletin to CINCPAC in Honolulu, but in 1957 this function was taken over by CIA. OCI's representatives to CINCPAC- [redacted]

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25X1A [redacted] had the CIB text reproduced in ditto to resemble the domestic product, but the maps could not be reproduced. In this period, by request, OCI began cabling the Bulletin to the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) in Colorado Springs, and to the DDI representative [redacted]. Later, more CIA field stations asked for the CIB. 26/

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Even prior to the commencement of cable dissemination to CIA stations, the CIB had been sent electrically for the use of U.S. personnel at international conferences. [redacted]

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In recent years, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have usually asked to have the CIB cabled to them whenever they are out of the country. Automatically, the CIB is made available to the President and Vice President when they are on tour.

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Miscellany

The gist and comment style of early Bulletin items had the advantage of clearly separating the field report from the interpretations or prognoses of the analyst. This was regarded by the management as a necessary precaution when OCI was a young organization. After a few years, however, confidence in the staff had increased to the point where an integrated presentation of material, weaving field reporting together with analysis, was permitted. Such items, which became frequent by 1954, were indicated by the caption, "Comment on." This form was particularly useful for the prompt analysis of Soviet developments announced by the press or radio. Comment pieces were normally of customary length, but one ran to seven pages! This appeared in the issue of 4 July 1957 and dealt with Khrushchev's purge of the Presidium.

So far as anyone can recall, there has been only one instance in which the DCI himself has written a Bulletin item. This occurred sometime in 1957, when Mr. Dulles turned out a piece on the difficulties confronting Batista in Cuba. Mr. Dulles had

just participated in a discussion with State Department officers at which various new ideas had been put forth. The DCI felt that these were interesting enough to be shared with the President and other policy-makers. The Dulles piece was not typical of Bulletin items, running over two pages in length and being uncharacteristically speculative. 28/

Another unusual writer for the Bulletin was the Deputy Director for Plans. In 1954, the Clandestine Services had an interest in the rebellion of Carlos Castillo Armas against the leftist regime of Jacobo Arbenz. In Bulletin-type situations in which CIA is involved, it has usually been felt advisable to run a careful item rather than to draw attention by omitting coverage. Obviously, such items have to be coordinated thoroughly with the Clandestine Services. In June 1954, when the forces of Armas invaded Guatemala, word was received in Washington in the middle of the night.

25X1A [redacted] Western Division Chief, and [redacted] 25X1A
25X1A [redacted] were called to "L" Building to consult with the DDP,

Frank Wisner. Wisner decided to write his own item, and dictated it to his secretary. When he 25X1A was finished, [redacted] explained that OCI would have to treat the report as an incoming cable, and process it in the usual editorial fashion. Wisner was not happy about this, but the item was edited and run, and there were no repercussions. 29/

IV. The Central Intelligence BulletinChallenge and Plans

The fairly smooth sailing which the CIB enjoyed from 1951 to 1957 was disturbed by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. On 18 March 1957, Brig. General John F. Cassidy, Staff Director of the Board, sent a Memorandum 30/ to the DCI, advising him that "As you are no doubt aware, the President's Board has just completed a rather comprehensive study of the Current Intelligence activities of the Intelligence Community..." The Board found little evidence that CIA's statutory responsibility for the correlation and evaluation of national intelligence, insofar as it applied to current intelligence, was being authoritatively discharged. It observed that there appeared to be no current intelligence periodic publication carrying the correlated judgments of the several elements of the intelligence community. The Board granted that CIA's daily and weekly publications came "closest to having the stature of Community documents," but said that they had a "limited

Community usefulness" and that their contents were not always endorsed by the other elements of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). Clearly the State and Defense Departments had registered complaints.

The Board pointed out that each IAC agency was producing its own current intelligence independently, and arriving at its own political, economic, scientific, and technical judgments. The Board felt that in the interests of national security, a more closely correlated community current intelligence effort should be developed, and General Cassidy expressed confidence that the DCI was doubtless acting to effect necessary corrections.

Huntington Sheldon recommended to Mr. Dulles on 11 April that consultation with the IAC agencies on current intelligence be systematized and that the CIB be established as a "national current intelligence publication." 31/ He did not, however, want to create a national current intelligence board, or establish a formal IAC review process. He believed the required consultation could be conducted by CIA

officers who would maintain regular contacts with the departments. In his view, systematized consultation procedures should apply for the time being to the CIB. When it became clearer how the process would work, "a study of other current intelligence publications could be undertaken."

After consultation with the IAC, Mr. Dulles replied to General Cassidy on 1 May that the IAC members were agreed that "the CIA daily and weekly publications are appropriate vehicles for the discharge of the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the timely production and dissemination of current intelligence relating to the national security." 32/ He noted that these publications were produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and the National Security Council. The IAC members concurred at the same time in the necessity for departmental current intelligence publications, "recognizing the importance of avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort." Dulles said it had been agreed that CIA would establish systematic consultation with the other IAC members

and he affirmed that CIA was instituting ways and means of ensuring that CIA officers, "in their continuous consultations" with the other intelligence organizations, "ascertain to the extent feasible departmental views on the selection and treatment of items contained in CIA publications." Evidently both the daily and weekly were meant.

The IAC decided to postpone any decision regarding the exact nature of the new procedures pending further study. However, anticipating the change, a draft revision of NSCID-3 on the Coordination of Intelligence Production was made on 30 July 1957 to formalize CIA's role in producing current intelligence to meet external requirements. (This document was not formally issued until 13 January 1958.) The pertinent passage reads, "Normally, the current intelligence produced by the CIA is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and National Security Council; in addition it serves the common needs of the interested Departments and Agencies of the Government for current intelligence which they themselves do not produce. The Departments

and Agencies will contribute to the CIA current intelligence publications as practicable." 33/

In the midst of CIA's period of study as to how to produce coordinated current intelligence, something of a bombshell was exploded by Lyman Kirkpatrick, then Inspector General, who on 25 September made proposals which he admitted would "rouse strong objections and opposition." 34/ His plan in essence was to create an inter-agency current intelligence unit responsible to the IAC and supplanting OCI. The executive agent of the IAC for this purpose would be the DCI, and the unit's chairman would be a CIA employee chosen by the DCI. The chairman would have final authority over the unit's work.

Confronted with Kirkpatrick's plan, as well as by the earlier commitment to devise a system of coordination, OCI did some stock-taking and proposing of its own. There are two unsigned OCI memoranda, dated 5 and 10 October 1957, both entitled "Resumé of the Problem," which set OCI's objective as "To plan a new or revised daily Bulletin which the policy maker cannot afford not to read." 35/ They cite "criticism of the present

daily Bulletin" and suggest ways of meeting it.

Among the findings are these: (1) Items are based only on material received on each publication day, creating a weakness because important situations may be ignored for lack of a cable "peg." Remedy: Prepare items even if no "peg" is available. (2) There is not sufficient continuity from day to day on important situations.

Remedy: Continuity items could be provided.

(3) "The present publication is not read by top officials. It is not established as 'must' reading. At best, portions of it may be conveyed to these officials by briefing officers." Some of the reasons for this appeared to be that the information was already known to the official through his own department channels; that the item did not seem of pressing importance or that the official did not find treatment of the problems he did regard as pressing; that items were too detailed and too complex; and that the official felt the items were not adequately premonitory.

The memoranda considered that the problems of the policy-maker might be met by producing at the greatest possible speed, raising the standard of

selectivity, making a greater effort to report on matters known to be under policy consideration, being concise, and combining factual information with evaluation, stressing short-term probabilities and possibilities. "The policy-maker wants value judgments, not simple facts. Emphasis should be on the premonitory aspect." The memoranda also observed that "Sufficient IAC coordination should be achieved to give the publication status as a community publication, produced under the direction of the DCI."

On 17 October, Sheldon made a proposal to the Director that involved retaining current intelligence production in OCI, but providing a direct role for the other IAC agencies. 36/ Agency representatives would meet each day in panel session with the Assistant Director for Current Intelligence to review a Brief, an intelligence tour d'horizon which would be the concisest part of the daily. The over-all publication would be renamed the Central Intelligence Bulletin. The Brief would be supported by backup items "treating important situations in some depth." Sheldon's objective was to produce

a publication "which a responsible policy-maker will be able to ignore only at his own peril."

Sheldon's memorandum indicated that new efforts would be made to reach this objective. Full use would be made of all source materials, preliminary views of the other agencies would be obtained early each day, CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence and Office of Research and Reports would have a more active role, and ONE and the DDP would be represented on the panel. The new Bulletin would attempt to foreshadow coming events and emerging situations, provide perspective and continuity by publishing status reports, and furnish greater coverage of scientific, economic, and indications intelligence.

There was general Agency concurrence in this plan, and OCI proceeded to turn out sample issues of the new daily for two weeks. 37/ Dulles, having accepted the plan himself, presented a memorandum on it to the IAC on 3 December 1957, saying that since the subject had been raised at the IAC meetings in the spring, CIA had continued to examine the problem of "producing current intelligence relating to the national security." 38/ He noted

that in that period, "we have seen a growing demand by senior government officials to be guarded against surprise." He felt a workable formula had been found in the proposed Central Intelligence Bulletin, which he wanted to launch in the near future.

In their meetings of 18 and 27 December, the IAC representatives agreed that CIA would be the primary producer of the new daily. The right to register dissent was accepted, and provision was made for noting late items on which consultation had not been possible. 39/ Dulles said he would inform the NSC that he had been assured of the co-operation of the IAC agencies in the production of the daily. 40/ He would, however, retain final authority over its content. Since the new publication would be based on all-source materials, Dulles told the IAC that it would be disseminated on a strict need-to-know basis agreed to by the IAC. 41/

The system worked out for production of the new Bulletin (every day except Sunday) called for an early morning selection by OCI of the material it wanted to use, preliminary consultation by phone

with the other agencies to get their views, drafting of briefs and backup items and their dissemination to the IAC agencies by early afternoon, and the convening of the panel, under the AD/CI or an alternate, in the later afternoon to consider the Daily Brief. The backup items were not to be considered by the panel, but were to be edited by OCI's own production staff.

A dry run of the new Bulletin was conducted on an IAC-wide basis during the week beginning 6 January 1958, and on 14 January the Central Intelligence Bulletin made its formal appearance. Two days later it was adorned with a bold new cover.

In speaking to the NSC early in January, Mr. Dulles set his explanation of the new daily against the background of the critical problems the United States faced all over the world as a result of the expanding Sino-Soviet Communist menace. 42/ He said he had undertaken the new publication to ensure the highest level of timeliness and accuracy in intelligence reporting so that it would be of the greatest value to the policy-making branches of the government. CIA would take the clear ..

responsibility for seeing that the problems requiring policy decisions were pinpointed and reported on. But CIA could not guarantee that it would be heard. It could not go beyond its responsibilities. If intelligence reporting went unheeded, then the responsibility must rest elsewhere. He urged the NSC members to give the Bulletin their personal attention and see that the right people in their departments were aware of it and of its nature and purposes.

Operation

The first issue of the new Bulletin was a formidable-looking document. Up front was the Daily Brief--12 items of six to eight lines each. No headlines were provided, but the items were grouped by geographic areas. On somewhat longer sheets behind the Brief were backup articles for eight of the items. The backups, for the first time in the Bulletin, carried exact sourcing by document number. The Daily Brief items of this first issue were titled as follows:

I. Communist Bloc

Kremlin wants to force Summit meeting.

Chicoms have concluded trade and technical agreements with Yemen.

Chicoms have offered \$20 million economic aid to Indonesia.

\$300 million of Soviet gold was sold in the West last year.

II. Asia-Africa

Top Syrian military figures are preparing to take control.

Ghana to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Election of Okinawa mayor shows dissatisfaction with U.S.

Sihanouk's anti-Communist outburst motivated by alarm over local Communist boldness.

El Al will resume Israel-Johannesburg flights.

III. The West

Macmillan has set up a committee to study "disengagement in central Europe."

Premier Gaillard plans constitutional reform proposals.

Venezuelan President Perez has taken charge of the Defense Ministry.

Taking account of President Eisenhower's fondness for graphics, the new Bulletin soon included

a map of the two hemispheres with red arrows to locate the areas covered by the items appearing in each issue.

Given the active participation of the other agencies and the focus of interest on the CIB as the main current intelligence organ for the White House, it is not surprising that dissemination jumped after the Current Intelligence Bulletin became the Central Intelligence Bulletin. In fact, dissemination almost doubled. Most of the increase, which took the total to 90 copies sent out of CIA, was attributable to the strong demand from the Department of Defense, which raised its subscription from 24 to 54 copies. But State Department readership went from 5 to 14, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission were added. Under the heading of White House distribution, the President still received Copy No. 1 and General Cassidy had his copy, but a new recipient was the Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, Mr. Randall. 43/ This dissemination was determined in the wake of the IAC's agreement that the new daily would be distributed on a strict need-to-know basis.

The coverage of foreign events did not basically change in the interagency-coordinated Bulletin, but the items now came under the critical gaze of representatives from three agencies. (The Defense Department was represented by personnel from each of the three services until DIA was set up in 1961, so that, from one point of view, five agencies processed the CIB.) Since the coordination mechanism had arisen out of the objections of the State and Defense Departments to the previous unilateral system, the representatives from these agencies approached the process of coordination with some gusto, determined to make their mark. Rigorous criticism caused some items to fall that would otherwise have been printed, and forced modifications in other items. Whether material for the CIB now had to meet "higher standards" is a matter of opinion. The argument has often been made that coordination waters down pungent messages until they are inoffensive to anybody--and much less useful. Certainly there have been numerous cases of this kind, but probably a general judgment would require a separate investigation.

For some time, the panel meetings were chaired by Sheldon himself, and the State and Defense Departments sent fairly high-level representatives. Meetings tended to be long and difficult, and disputes were carried on by phone for hours after the panel broke up. Sheldon recalls that he adopted a firm line with the other agencies, inviting them to take dissenting footnotes, as provided by the agreement. For a while, they did this, but they sometimes "looked silly" in cold type. 44/ On one occasion in 1958, involving a French item, Deane Hinton, State's representative, wrote a dissent that ran counter to a National Intelligence Estimate on France that had just been issued, and which had been approved by the State Department. 45/

Eventually the State and Defense Departments adopted a somewhat more relaxed attitude and sent somewhat lower-level representatives to panel meetings. This by no means ended all arguments, but it did make them less frequent. The representatives still came instructed by their intelligence organizations, which had often coordinated with the policy desks, and points at issue were still

cleaned up after the panel. There were always repercussions when policy toes were stepped on.

Doctrine in respect to proper material for the CIB was, as before, imprecise, and many argued that it could not be otherwise. The decisions made each day reflected many factors: knowledge of what policy questions were occupying the policy-makers, the adequacy of press reporting, and the personal makeup of the panel (since substitutions occurred for each of the agencies). A test often applied was whether the subject matter was likely to call for a U.S. policy decision. Many items were also run strictly on the ground that they conveyed information which the policymaker ought not to miss. This was frequently the case in regard to political developments in non-crisis areas.

In the new Bulletin, as in the old, the range of coverage was wide, including many publicly-known events and many clandestine matters. In its semi-annual reports for the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (later the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board), OCI for some time after the creation of the new Bulletin stressed its success in forecasting developments. 46/ Among the premonitory reports it listed in 1958-59 were:

Anti-US demonstrations in Latin America during Nixon's trip;

Revolt in Lebanon;

The Algerian crisis and de Gaulle's rise;

Renewed Taiwan Strait crisis;

UAR-backed plots against Qasim;

Changes of regime in Burma, Pakistan, and Sudan.

The CIB did not anticipate the Iraqi coup of 14 July 1958 or the Tibetan revolt of 1959 nor did it predict the time and manner of Batista's fall in Cuba, although it gave "ample warning" of the dictator's growing difficulties and the rising capabilities of Castro's rebels.

In 1959, and for a couple of years thereafter, the Berlin crisis and its diplomatic consequences--the Geneva conference and the abortive Summit meeting--caused the CIB to concentrate on Soviet-U.S. relations, though other strong themes were the

development of Soviet weapons systems, Chinese problems, and Sino-Soviet differences. There was a marked rise in the volume of African reporting, as former colonial territories gained their independence.

OCI's semi-annual report of 3 October 1958 noted that the sources of raw material for the CIB continued to follow an established pattern. More than [redacted] came from State cables and dispatches, [redacted] CIA Clandestine Services reports, [redacted] FBIS publications, [redacted] from Comint, [redacted] press reports, and [redacted] from reporting by military services. [redacted]

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25X1B

25X1B

In October 1958, a five-station broadcast net linking OCI simultaneously with the current intelligence components in State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was installed. This facility permitted the rapid exchange of consultative comments on the drafts of CIB items.

It was provided in the arrangements for the new Bulletin that CIA would unilaterally amend

items or insert new ones during the night, if fresh information made this necessary. An asterisk would be used to indicate such change. In the years following 1958, this practice became more frequent than contemplated because of the greater flow of incoming traffic and the heavier pressure for currency in the Bulletin. Moreover, in dealing with a continuing crisis situation, CIA preferred to write at the last possible moment (as late as 0300 or 0400 hours on the date of issue), when coordination was impossible. Asterisked items, however, often did not set well with the State and Defense Departments.

Late items were unavoidable in those cases when OCI did a World Roundup of reactions to some major development, usually a U.S. action, and had to wait until the wee hours to get the necessary foreign material.. Such Roundups have not been frequent, but have included the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the resumption of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in February 1966. Usually on these occasions, a Task Force of representatives from all the geographic areas in OCI has been assembled and has worked around the clock.

[Redacted]

There have been numerous cases over the years of the personal interest of very high-level officials in particular CIB items. In July 1962, the sudden appointment of a completely unknown individual as Prime Minister of Brazil required the preparation of a late Bulletin item to give some idea of the man's probable outlook and policies.

25X1A

[Redacted] of OCI knew nothing about the man previously, but with the help of [Redacted] of 25X1A Biographic Register was able to come up with enough to indicate that the new leader was not apt to be very friendly to U.S. interests. After publication of this item the next day, a cable from the U.S. Mission in Brasilia gave a favorable estimate of the Prime Minister, causing Secretary of State Rusk to complain to then CIA Director John McCone about the CIB story. A couple of days later Mr. Rusk apologized, after receiving a cable from the embassy in Rio that supported the Bulletin position. 47/

For many years it was incumbent on OCI analysts to call a control office in State for permission to use Limited Distribution cables in the CIB. Sometimes

[redacted]
these requests sparked interest up the line in State.

25X1A In March 1961, when [redacted] wanted to use a cable reporting certain remarkable ideas that West German Ambassador Kroll had about policy toward the U.S.S.R., Charles Bohlen, then special assistant to

25X1A Secretary Rusk, called [redacted] directly to make sure that this material would not be used in such a way as to suggest that Kroll's ideas were those of the Bonn government. 48/

In April 1962, R. Jack Smith of ONE succeeded Huntington Sheldon as Assistant Director for Current Intelligence. Major changes made in the Bulletin's production during Smith's tenure will be dealt with in the next two sections. Here it may be noted merely that an important change made by Smith in 1962 was the appointment of a group of Production Assistants (PA's), two for each of the three geographic areas into which OCI was divided. The PAs were to exercise broad substantive control over most of the publication's production of their areas, especially over the Bulletin. Smith felt that Bulletin items were often not up to standard as they came to the review panel; he also wanted to establish a single

[Redacted]

peg point in the process of editing and to eliminate multiple editing by branch, division, and sometimes area chiefs as had been the rule previously.

The PA system, which still exists, has generally improved the quality of CIB items. It has also inhibited, but not entirely eliminated, editing by administrative supervisors. No one questioned the right and obligation of the supervisors to be satisfied substantively with the product of their units, but Smith believed that, with the existence of the PAs, the supervisors could stay clear of stylistic editing. That they have not entirely done so is no doubt partly attributable to the difficulty of separating substance from style.

V. Problems and Reform Efforts, 1962-64

The 1958 reconstitution of the Bulletin had made it a stronger publication. By 1962, its special status as a report designed particularly for the White House and NSC had been generally recognized. There was no other daily intelligence product possessing the character of national intelligence, carrying Comint as well as collateral, and having the blessing of the chief components of the intelligence community.

There was a shadow over the Bulletin nonetheless, and it took the form of the new security classifications for specially sensitive materials. The existence and products of sophisticated new technological means of intelligence collection could be revealed to only a few on a need-to-know basis. Those with proper clearances were a much more restricted group than the recipients of the Bulletin, whose ranks had been constantly growing. The consequence was that, increasingly in the years after 1958, the most sensitive intelligence--which was often the most useful--was barred from the community's top coordinated publication, and had to be conveyed

[Redacted]

to high-level officials by means of briefings and occasional ad hoc reports.

In his first few months in the White House, President John F. Kennedy was a reader of the Bulletin. In fact, he and McGeorge Bundy got on the phone together one time to talk to [Redacted] 25X1A Latin American Division Chief, about a Cuban item. 49/ Kennedy's interest, however, evaporated after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961. In an effort to re-establish communications with the President on intelligence matters, Huntington Sheldon and Major General Chester Clifton, the President's senior military aide, agreed on a new publication to be tailored specifically to Kennedy's requirements and to incorporate the ultra-sensitive intelligence which the Bulletin could not use. With Richard Lehman of the OCI staff as the first writer, Sheldon began producing the President's Intelligence Checklist in June 1961

The introduction of the Checklist, however, was not a satisfactory solution to the classification problem because, while the Bulletin had too broad a dissemination, the Checklist did not go to the 15 to

25 principal presidential advisors who had a need to know. Moreover, these advisors presumably needed more detail than the Checklist provided.

In July 1962, a few months after he succeeded Huntington Sheldon as Assistant Director for Current Intelligence, R. Jack Smith suggested to the DDI, Ray S. Cline, that it was time to overhaul OCI's publications to meet the problems of classification limitation, over-dissemination, and diffused effort. 50/ He argued that by trying to carry out the secondary mission assigned to the Agency by NSCID-3--that of furnishing to the other IAC agencies current intelligence they themselves did not produce--OCI was blunting its primary mission of serving the White House and NSC. Smith proposed a new all-source Daily Bulletin with dissemination restricted to 15 to 25 top officials outside CIA. He admitted that in many ways it might duplicate the President's Checklist, but he felt both products were needed.

The dissemination problem is indicated in the fact that by 1963 the external distribution of the CIB had soared to 187 hard copies. Nearly all of the increment of 97 copies over 1958 was accounted for by

increased distribution in the Defense Department, although the White House staff itself was taking 13 more copies than before, and the Treasury Department, Director of the Budget, and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency had been added as recipients. In addition to the hard copies, the Agency was sending 25X1A the CIB by cable to [redacted] CIA stations abroad, while DIA was cabling it to 35 overseas military commands, which probably disseminated it further to various sub-commands. 51/

Another problem--outside competition--was also rising. The Defense Intelligence Agency, created in 1961, had led off its effort to produce unified military intelligence by launching a DIA Intelligence Summary. While the Summary ran under the banner of "departmental" intelligence, it did not confine itself to military intelligence. Its coverage was broad and very similar to that of the CIB. Its dissemination was greater than that of the CIB, and it took deliberate aim at the highest level audience, including the White House and NSC.

A request by CIA Director McCone that OCI review the distribution of the CIB to see whether it could be reduced gave Jack Smith an opportunity to deal with

the whole spectrum of current intelligence problems.

52/ In a memorandum of 18 January 1963, Smith took the position that a reduced distribution of the CIA Bulletin would not confine readership to an inner circle because DIA "insists with some jealousy on its right to publish any sensitive material in its Summary which we publish in the Bulletin." DIA had an advantage in the fact that CIA had to coordinate its Bulletin with DIA, but DIA did not have to coordinate its Summary with CIA. Smith proposed that CIA give up coordination and that it produce a range of current intelligence publications, each intended for a definite audience. For the President, there would continue to be the Checklist; for around 20 to 40 policy advisors, there would be a new all-source Brief, with no wire dissemination; for the "common needs of the interested departments and agencies of the Government" there would be Comint and secret dailies. These last could be sent by wire to any ambassador, chief of station, or military commander. They could also supply economic and political intelligence to DIA, which could then cease duplicating CIA's efforts. Smith looked forward to a decision by the Defense Department to confine DIA to departmental intelligence, automatically making

the Summary more specialized than it then was..

In the same memorandum, Smith went into more detail about the difficulties with DIA: "DIA will agree only with great reluctance to the publication of a military item before it is able to publish on the same subject itself. This is especially true of anything dealing with advanced weaponry." Moreover, DIA's insistence on the right to reproduce anything appearing in the Bulletin threatened a cut-off by State of certain sensitive information. DD/P was also exhibiting an unwillingness to clear information that would be used by DIA.

The Director outlined some of these difficulties in a meeting with Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric on 24 January 1963. 53/ He pointed out that the Summary was duplicative, and that DIA's insistence on equal publishing rights blocked CIA's plans to give the President and his advisors privileged coverage of sensitive matters. He made clear that the need for CIA to coordinate its Bulletin items meant that sensitive materials had to be circulated to the working level in the USIB agencies. He expressed the view that the best solution was to charge CIA explicitly and exclusively with the production of current intelligence

on sensitive matters of national importance, and to charge DIA with the production of only such additional military intelligence as it required.

Events took a different turn on 27 February 1963 when Director McCone suggested, and Mr. Gilpatrick agreed, that representatives of their agencies should explore the possibility of wholly or partly combining the dailies of CIA and DIA. Ray Cline, DDI, and Lyman Kirkpatrick, Executive Director, were designated to represent CIA, and Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director of DIA, and Solis Horwitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to represent the Pentagon. 54/

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, informed of this examination, took a keen interest "in view of the great importance which the Board attaches to the continuing need for adequate and timely reporting of current intelligence appraisals to meet the requirements of the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other key civilian and military officials having policy-recommending and command responsibilities." 55/

The four-man group made its report to the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 6 June 1963. 56/ It found that a merger of the CIB and the DIA Summary would be impractical because of the different purposes

of the publications and the different working methods used in producing them. The two publications were distinct, and each was needed. In the view of the group, the CIB's role was that of a "national intelligence daily," serving the needs of the President and other senior policy-makers of the government. It was adjudged to be "well suited to its role" and it was noted that it represented "as much as practicable" the coordinated views of the intelligence community. The CIB should, in fact, be renamed the National Intelligence Bulletin. "The Defense Intelligence Summary, on the other hand, is designed and produced as a departmental publication...primarily to satisfy the needs of the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the unified and specified commands." The report stated that "in general the DIA will not cover an item outside the military/defense area if it is being treated in the CIB."

The group found that though DIA was "quite willing" to restrict dissemination of its daily to the Defense Department, such a restriction should not--and probably could not--be strictly enforced. The

group, however, expressed the view that the present broad electrical dissemination of the two dailies in Washington and abroad had "evolved without the benefit of coordinated planning or rationale. As a result, intelligence designed for high level consumers in Washington and derived from sensitive sources appears to be being made available--counter to the President's wishes--to lower level consumers in Washington and abroad who have no absolute need-to-know." The four suggested that this subject be further examined by USIB, and that meanwhile CIA and DIA work out a coordinated plan for electrical dissemination to the field with the aim of reducing duplication and of ensuring that all senior U.S. representatives abroad were adequately served.

On 14 August Cline reported to USIB on this agreement on the roles of CIA and DIA in daily current intelligence production. He spoke of the serious problems resulting from the increasingly broad dissemination of sensitive intelligence, and suggested that a CIA/State/DIA ad hoc committee study this question. State felt such a committee should also study the conceptual problems involved in producing current

national intelligence as compared with current departmental intelligence. USIB approved both suggestions.

The ad hoc Committee, consisting of Jack Smith for CIA, Thomas Hughes, head of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Director of DIA's Current Intelligence and Indications Center (CIIC), met on 5 September 1963 "and discussed mutual problems relating to the Central Intelligence Bulletin." 57/ State, having objected to renaming the CIB the National Intelligence Bulletin, had won DIA over to its side. Their argument was that publication procedures did not permit "full co-ordination" among the IAC agencies; therefore the product was not "national intelligence" in the strict sense of the word. Smith said CIA would not propose a name change. It was agreed that a detailed examination ought to be made to ascertain whether the distribution of the CIB and the DIA Summary was consistent with the security required by sensitive information. Smith broached the suggestion of a new, high-level Supplement to the CIB to enable the Agency to furnish the White House with an all-source

X1 publication. [redacted] and Hughes were interested in this idea, but saw problems in it. It was decided to establish a working group to examine all the questions discussed, and to present suggested solutions to them.

25X1A The working group (Richard Lehman, CIA; Edward Davis, INR; and [redacted] DIA) held a number of meetings from 10 September to 20 November 1963. In Lehman's view, CIA had three major objectives:

"a. To force general recognition that the CIB is the proper vehicle for current intelligence at the national level. b. To open the CIB to sensitive materials not now usable in it in order to regularize the briefing of NSC-level consumers on these materials. c. To eliminate the present broadside dissemination of certain other sensitive materials both by CIA and DIA." 58/ CIA was only partially successful in achieving its goals. It did gain agreement on a new "legend" for the CIB (the legend being the paragraphs inside the front cover that explain the publication's purpose). Instead of stating simply that CIB was produced by the DCI in consultation with other USIB agencies, the legend would now

read that the CIB was produced by the DCI "to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials." DIA had already changed the legend of its Summary to indicate its departmental nature. Practically, however, nothing would be changed by reworded legends. CIA wanted the theory reflected in practice; it wanted a distinct differentiation between the material it sent to the White House and the publication sent by DIA.

The main debate in the working group was over CIA's plan for a new all-source Supplement to the Bulletin to be sent to a very restricted readership. CIA proposed to use in this Supplement sensitive material not allowed in the CIB. It also proposed to use in the new publication--and to stop using in the regular CIB and DIA Summary--sensitive traffic from State (the Limit Distribution cables) and from the CIA Clandestine Services [redacted]

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X1

25X1C

25X1C

[redacted] certain diplomatic reports

25X1

State fully supported CIA's plan, but DIA adamantly opposed it, arguing that it would result in an "unacceptably large" loss of DIA Summary content and that the present system did not require change. 60/ Lehman commented that "DIA is unable to state its real objection to CIA's proposals, i.e., that they reduce its ability to compete with CIA in the current intelligence field." 61/ In the end, rather than offer the USIB a split report, CIA found a way to drop its plan for a CIB Supplement.

In respect to CIA's third objective in the talks--that of curtailing dissemination of national security intelligence--some progress was made. The agreed version of the working group report, submitted on 14 February 1964, noted that both the CIB and DIA Summary were designed for a high-level readership, and, at the same time, were used as a daily current intelligence service by officials at a lower level, both in Washington and to a much greater extent in the field. The group recognized that the foreign missions of the U.S. national security agencies needed such a service, but believed that certain materials "may be too sensitive for regular dissemination

[redacted]

to all readers currently carried on CIB and DIS dissemination lists." 62/

To remedy the situation, the working group agreed that distribution of both the CIB and DIA Summary should be limited to national security policy-makers and other officials who had a regular need-to-know. CIA and DIA would try to reduce hard copy distribution of their dailies by 20% to 40%. By March 1965, external dissemination of the CIB had been cut 31% to a figure of 129, with most of the reduction at the expense of recipients in the Pentagon. 63/ In respect to cable dissemination of the dailies, it was agreed that

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and [redacted] material would not ordinarily be used.

The working group conducted a full review of the interagency procedures used in producing the Bulletin, clarified some of them, and tried to improve others. For circulation to all personnel of the three agencies concerned with the Bulletin, CIA prepared papers defining the criteria used by the panel chairman in selecting CIB items, in deciding whether to run a late item, and in handling

[Redacted]

dissents. Suggestions were made to speed up CIA's dissemination of draft items to permit greater consideration of them, and CIA agreed to re-examine ways of reporting potentially dangerous situations where a definite development was lacking.

The report of the working group, as transmitted by its parent ad hoc committee, was "noted" by the USIB on 10 March 1964.

What enabled CIA to give up its proposed CIB Supplement was permission to expand distribution of the President's Intelligence Checklist which was renamed the President's Daily Brief in 1964.^{64/} President Kennedy had wanted this very tightly held to only three recipients. In January 1964, however, the White House agreed that eight more recipients could be added. This was an improvement over the previous state of affairs, but it was not CIA's preferred solution to the problem of furnishing all-source intelligence to the top policy-makers.

For one thing, CIA would rather have restricted the Checklist to the one person for whom it was designed. For another, to the extent that the circle of Checklist readers was enlarged, the status of the

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Bulletin as the high-level daily on national security affairs was undermined. From its beginning in 1961, the Checklist had had this effect; now it was having more.

It is difficult to gauge accurately the impact of the Checklist on the Bulletin because of insufficient knowledge of the reading habits of top echelon officials. Certainly some of the damage to the CIB was purely psychological, arising from the knowledge that there was a publication meant especially for the Chief Executive and carrying material which the CIB, because of its wide distribution, could not use. Ipsso facto, the CIB was the No. 2 publication.

On the other hand, the utilization of the CIB was not necessarily diminished. The President himself had not been a regular reader of the CIB since the Truman days, a fact belatedly accepted as normal in July 1965, when the No. 1 copy began to be sent to the Vice President instead of the President. Nevertheless, the status of the Bulletin as a document important to the White House was embarrassingly underlined by a photograph in the New York Times Magazine of 28 March 1965, showing President Johnson walking

in the White House grounds with McGeorge Bundy, who was holding a copy of the Bulletin with the codeword easily legible. Normally, like President Eisenhower, President Johnson has received selections from the CIB chosen by his staff.

Whether the Secretary of Defense, two of his principal aides, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff switched to reading the PDB in preference to the Bulletin is not known; they have remained recipients of both. Secretary of State Rusk continues to have an assistant underline the CIB for him. A large group of highly influential policy-makers have continued to receive the Bulletin but not the PDB. As one of them--Averell Harriman--remarked, "The way I keep up on things is by reading the CIB every day." 65/

Harriman returned to Washington from an official tour of eight Latin American countries in the summer of 1965 appalled at the lack of current information on the part of U.S. Embassy personnel, and suggested that they should be able to read the CIB. Accordingly, CIA added these capitals to the Bulletin cable dissemination list. 66/

VI. The Bulletin in Recent Years

While CIA was trying from 1962 to 1964 to break through with a realignment of publications, a transformation of the Bulletin was gradually taking place. The brief and backup format of 1958 had become progressively less popular in the 1960s. Robert Amory, DDI until 1962, had felt that the backups were not read, although other agencies charged that CIA occasionally used them to convey views which it had not been able to get the panel to accept for the Brief. 67/ Beyond these factors, there was the judgment of the OCI leadership that a single, unified presentation was best. From 1962 backup items became rarer and rarer, until finally on 14 December 1964 the CIB was issued without the opening caption "Daily Brief," meaning that the old format had been abandoned in practice as well as principle.

Other Bulletin changes brought about by Jack Smith were the printing of only one item to a page and the adoption of a short, one-sentence first paragraph for each item to carry the central message of the piece. Previously, the lead paragraph had often only "set the stage," with the main intelligence

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story coming later. The use of maps and illustrations also increased greatly after 1962.

In recent years, dissents have only rarely appeared in the Bulletin. On two occasions in 1964, the State Department took footnotes disagreeing with CIA's assessment of the increasing Communist influence in the Goulart government in Brazil. A spectacular case arose in June 1965, following a week's effort by the State Department to squash any reporting suggesting that the U.S.-Canadian auto agreement might be used by the Europeans as an excuse to conclude their own preferential arrangements. A three-sentence warning note in the CIB was followed by a seven-sentence State footnote belittling the impact of the auto agreement. Policy considerations were evidently governing State intelligence. Since it was decreed that the note and footnote must fit onto one page, it was necessary to put the footnote into "script" type. A search of some hours around town produced the man who knew where the proper type-face was kept! Such are the practical difficulties that flow from interagency disputes. 68/

A major reason for the infrequency of dissents is the extraordinary pains taken by OCI to bring about agreement and, if necessary, to educate other agencies to the facts. For example, [redacted]

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Venezuelan analyst, was faced in April 1967 with coordinating an item with his INR counterpart. The INR man, young and inexperienced in Latin American affairs, doubted that there had been increased guerrilla activity in Venezuela, or that it represented much of a problem for the Caracas government. It required three days of argument and explanation before INR could be brought around to agreeing to a proposed text. 69/ Coordination problems such as this materially hamper efforts to speed up the production process and make Bulletin items more timely.

On 17 January 1966, E. Drexel Godfrey, formerly chief of OCI's Western Area, succeeded Jack Smith as Assistant Director, Current Intelligence. (In conformity with new Agency practice, his title soon afterwards was changed to Director, Current Intelligence.) Shortly after Godfrey's accession, the high speed facsimile system, known as Long Distance Xerography (LDX), went into operation, linking the CIA

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Operations Center with the White House Situation Room, the National Military Command Center, and the State Department Operations Center. Later in the year the National Security Agency was added to the network. This system permits the immediate transmission of document images and their reproduction. Since 1966, all draft briefs for the Bulletin have been sent to the State and Defense Departments through this system.

The OCI contribution to the Annual Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1965 had stated that "The chief function of CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) continued to be the writing and publication of the Central Intelligence Bulletin. The Bulletin continues to be the government's formal national-level current intelligence publication." 70/ The corresponding report for 1966, however, led off with facts about the PDB, which was described as "the primary publication of the Office of Current Intelligence." Comment on the CIB was confined to this statement: "The national-level, all-source, current intelligence daily, the Central Intelligence Bulletin, continues to be produced under

the chairmanship of an OCI senior officer." 71/
The impression conveyed by the 1966 report could easily be that the OCI front office had suddenly lost interest in the Bulletin. Such was not Mr. Godfrey's attitude, however. He planned, in fact, to elevate the Bulletin's status over a period of time along the lines attempted by Smith in 1963.

On 14 November 1966 the Bulletin appeared with a new cover, uniform in design with all issuances of the Directorates of Intelligence and of Science and Technology. One feature of the cover is a colored stripe (red) in the upper right-hand corner indicating that the publication contains Comint material and that it must be held in Comint channels.

In the past few years, the range of subject matter of the Bulletin has been typical of former times, but the depth of coverage has decreased, except on the subjects of the greatest official interest. Crises of some length--like those in Indonesia, Nigeria, the Dominican Republic, Rhodesia, and in Communist China over the cultural revolution--have received very close attention. The treatment of the Soviet Union has been limited by the amount

[Redacted]

of worthwhile field reporting. Soviet coverage is strongest on the side of military and space developments, where quite good source material is available. The main story for the Bulletin, however, has been Vietnam. Since January 1965, an abbreviated version of the daily Vietnam Situation Report has been carried with very few interruptions as the first item in each Bulletin.

External distribution of the CIB has crawled up again since the cutback of 1965, and in April 1967 it stood at 160 hard copies. Eight of these went to Special Assistants to the President, 4 more to special presidential advisors, 1 to the Vice President, 18 to the State Department (the Secretary, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other top officials), 8 to the National Security Council, and 91 to the Defense Department. Of the last, about one-third went to policy and operational personnel, including the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary and Assistant Secretaries, the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy, the Joint Chiefs, and the top generals and admirals. Other policy-making recipients of at least one copy included the Treasury

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Department (the Secretary having a personal copy), the Bureau of the Budget, and the Directors of USIA, NASA, the AEC, and the FBI. 72/ In addition, CIA cabled a sanitized version of the CIB [redacted]

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X1 25X1A [redacted] CIA station chiefs, while the Defense Department cabled it to 47 military commands.

The picture of readership is not as encouraging as the dissemination lists would suggest. In an investigation of readership in the State Department

25X1A late in 1966, [redacted] Assistant for Special Projects, OCI, found that the Country Directors were apt not to read the Bulletin at all, and the Assistant Secretaries were not "prime consumers," although they were briefed from the Bulletin by INR. [redacted] reported that "the CIB is more useful at the Under-secretary/Secretary level." 73/

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The opinion has been expressed both by agency and non-Agency personnel that one reason for readership difficulties is that the CIB provides too thin an intelligence diet--i.e., that its coverage is too limited. In one of several critiques of the

25X1A Bulletin undertaken by OCI, [redacted] then Deputy

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Assistant Director, OCI, noted in mid-1964 the absence of reporting on numerous subjects he thought recipients would look for. 74/ The "must" items are usually evident to all, and increasingly the Bulletin has consisted mostly of them. What beyond them should be reported, if anything, is a matter of continuing debate and varying practice.

Richard Lehman, in his Criteria for Selection of CIB Items, circulated in 1964 to all USIB personnel involved with the Bulletin, noted that the yardstick that items have a relation to "national security" interests was so broad as to give "virtually no guidance to the selector." And the criterion that items "must be important enough to be worth the attention of members of the National Security Council" was "exceptionally difficult to define further because of the large element of subjective judgment built into it." 75/ What happens in practice is that some supervisors in OCI operate on the theory that any major event in a country under their jurisdiction should be dealt with, while others take a far more selective approach. The tide has been with the latter group.

The question of content will certainly be thoroughly reviewed in connection with OCI's plans for the future. Mr. Godfrey intends to pick up the cause of several years ago and try to get the Bulletin upgraded to a truly all-source publication. It would then be possible to issue two other versions of the Bulletin--Comint and Secret. The contents of each of these versions, while basically the same, could be tailored to each of three important audiences, the President and his closest advisors, other top-level policy-makers, and the intelligence community at large.

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

The Central Intelligence Bulletin has been appearing each day, except Sundays and holidays, for over 16 years. It has long since become a prominent feature of the Washington intelligence scene. It has never lost sight of U.S. security interests as its main concern, and, while not infallible, it has usually given warning of crises and other important events. Still, it has not achieved a wholly satisfactory relationship with some of its subscribers. The fault may be theirs, or it may lie in the publication. If the latter, the defect is most likely one of content.

The question of who should be the Bulletin's main target is still a cardinal one. If the President's Daily Brief is to be continued regardless of any upgrading of the Bulletin, it should not be necessary to shape the CIB to fit the needs of the President and a handful of his top advisors. The Bulletin could then be aimed at all the other high-level policy-makers, including the generalist, who has to get into the nuts and bolts of almost any problem from time to time and who has to keep up

to a degree with everything, as well as the high-level specialist, who not only has his particular assignment, but wants to know the highlights of developments outside his specialty.

Since the first objective of the Bulletin has been to try to assist the high-level policy-maker in dealing with his respective problems, OCI's chief effort has not been to bring this policy-maker the "news" as it is received from various field sources. (The policy-maker will usually have this news as soon as CIA through his own copy of the pertinent report or cable.) Rather, the Bulletin has stressed the evaluation of the news.

Evaluation was made a key feature of Bulletin reporting from the start, since most reports from the field raise questions that have to be answered before there is real guidance for policy-making. Are the facts as alleged in the report? How significant is the development? To what is it likely to lead? One of the chief functions of CIA, and one it is particularly well qualified to carry out, is to make an independent judgment on such questions. The record of the CIB in making an analytical contribution is generally good. The fact that some

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Bulletin addressees are not as interested in the publication as they might be, however, suggests that OCI should lose no opportunity to exploit the specialized knowledge and experience of its staff and take even more care to identify and deal forthrightly with the primary intelligence questions of interest to the policy-maker. More might also be done with original analysis--putting pieces together to get a new picture, instead of waiting to comment on the picture as reported by foreign posts.

Apart from assisting the policy-maker with his special concerns, the CIB has had the second function of briefing him on the rest of the world scene. The generalist especially wants a broad briefing; the specialist needs it to understand the context of world developments within which his own field of responsibility exists. The Bulletin has attempted to present each item as a single report, to be read in its entirety in a short time. Even so, what OCI has regarded as the maximum number of about twelve items in each Bulletin has seldom been reached. As a world report, the CIB

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has tried to be responsive to the requirements of its consumers, but it has been difficult for its producers to learn these requirements. It may also be that not enough attention has been given to the matter. A not unreasonable assumption is that the reader expects to find in the Bulletin important intelligence of three kinds-- anything directly affecting U.S. security interests, things affecting other major U.S. interests, and developments he should know about even if U.S. interests are not directly involved. He may wonder whether there are only five or six items a day worth reporting under these categories.

As it comes to its subscribers, the CIB is a highly refined product prepared by well-trained professionals. The screening, writing, and re-
25X1A viewing process involves [Redacted] OCI analysts, numerous branch, division, and area chiefs, production assistants, the panel chairman, and the representatives of the State and Defense Departments, who are backed up by the analysts of their own organizations. Other offices and units of CIA--OER, OSR, and OSI--are also regular participants.

Without an organization of this magnitude, a publication having the informed treatment of the Bulletin would not be possible.

Granting that the recipient is getting a good product as far as it goes, it may be questioned whether the Bulletin goes far enough. Are the readers' interests really as narrow as the Bulletin's on any given day of issue? Could it be that the Bulletin, intent on being a high-level publication, has been too selective? Could it do something to correct this tendency by a more conscious referral to U.S. interests in the several areas of the world? Perhaps succinct statements of these interests could be set down as guides to the selection of subject matter. Such statements would also be useful in determining what "status report" items should be written--even in the absence of current development "pegs" on which to hang them.

Naturally, the CIB should not duplicate other material its readers have seen, but there is reason to believe that the major stories in the New York Times and the Washington Post constitute most of the common reading of all the policy-makers. It

is probable that the high-level specialist sees little official traffic outside his area, while the generalist is either plunged deep in a particular problem or is reading only the cream of the take from all sources. Thus, prominent subjects in the press need not be ruled out of court for Bulletin treatment. OCI has undoubtedly been correct in its willingness to deal with such subjects when there is something important to add from classified traffic, when erroneous press reports need to be corrected, or when the analyst can throw additional valuable light on a matter.

Speed of processing Bulletin items has been improving over the years and will remain a very important consideration. If investigation should prove that recipients of the CIB would like to get preliminary draft items as soon as they can be transmitted by ticker, it should be possible to make such an arrangement. Some recipients, however, presumably would prefer to see all proposed drafts at the same time, and they, too, could be accommodated.

Style is a much less important consideration than content, assuming that the CIB will always be

written in good, clear English. The present terse, business-like style causes unhappiness to various individuals, and the CIB might make better reading if it were more gracefully written. The community review procedure, however, seems inevitably to make economy of language the highest stylistic goal. Still, there is nothing to bar testing sentiment on this issue.

Overall, there is little doubt that the CIB has played a useful role in the intelligence support for policy-making, and present indications are that it will continue to do so. It must be borne in mind, however, that the main object of OCI is get the best possible current intelligence in the fastest way to the people who need it. The precise form of the vehicle through which this is done is not sacrosanct. There is no need to preserve any particular intelligence publication such as the Central Intelligence Bulletin just because it has had a long and honored life. New and better forms and methods of intelligence dissemination will surely be developed and should be sought actively.

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